Features > August 3, 2007

General Failure

An enduring crisis in civil-military relations threatens America’s future

By Gregory D. Foster

Largely unrecognized by the American public, unacknowledged by those in power, and denied by professionals in uniform, the United States suffers today from an enduring crisis in civil-military relations. The tacit social contract of mutual rights, obligations and expectations that binds the three parties to this relationship—the military, its civilian overseers and society—is seriously frayed.

This isn’t a crisis in the popular sense of the term. We need not fear a coup d’état from a military thoroughly socialized to sublimate such dramatic recourse. Troops aren’t occupying our homes (even though, as major newspapers and the American Civil Liberties Union have reported, they are monitoring our communications and infiltrating our gatherings). American combat units aren’t disintegrating in combat or openly defying orders. And regular polls by Harris and Gallup indicate that, regardless of the performance and behavior of those in uniform, the public hold the military in higher esteem than most other institutions of society—though it remains a mystery how we should interpret these findings.

This crisis is more akin to a lymphoma or termite infestation—its symptoms hidden and unnoticed—that surreptitiously destroys the infrastructure of the body or edifice from within. In this case, the end result could prove to be America’s strategic debilitation.

To grasp this crisis—its existence and its magnitude—we must consider how far the current state of civil-military relations in this country deviates from the ideal. A healthy state of civil-military relations requires: (1) a strategically effective (not just a militarily effective) military; (2) whose leaders provide strategically (not just militarily) sound advice to; (3) strategically competent civilian authorities—executive and legislative—who themselves are representative of and answerable to; (4) a civically engaged, strategically aware public; (5) all of which is undergirded by a critical free press, a vibrant civil society and a properly subordinated military-industrial complex. Today, we are failing on all these counts.

A strategically ineffective military

Far from strategically effective, today’s military borders on being strategically dysfunctional, perhaps not even militarily effective. A strategically effective military would, at a minimum, fulfill its expected obligations under the social contract of civil-military relations: operational competence, sound advice, political neutrality and social responsibility.

Is the military operationally competent? If by that we mean can it successfully accomplish all it is called upon to perform (from conventional combat operations to counterinsurgency to peacekeeping to disaster response)—without being disproportionately destructive, indiscriminately lethal, exorbitantly expensive or unduly escalatory—the answer is no. Iraq and Afghanistan are merely the latest examples of the military’s unyielding preference for a single way of war—conventional combat operations against conventional foes. These ongoing campaigns are also emblematic of the military’s resistance to seriously and permanently adapting to the unconventional operations (like counterinsurgency) against so-called asymmetric threats that characterize the global battlefield of today and tomorrow. Yes, there is a new army counterinsurgency field manual prepared under the hand of Gen. David Petraeus, the current U.S. commander in Iraq (See “Counterinsurgency 101,” March 2007). But like numerous such field manuals during the Vietnam era, it is destined to have little enduring impact on how the military actually operates and sees itself.

Superimposed on this is the institution’s chest-thumping culture of machismo, with its incessant talk of “warriors” and “warfighters.” One need only observe news footage of the heavy-handed, culturally insensitive, firepower-intensive tactics of U.S. troops in the field, frequently given to undisciplined individual behavior born of fear, immaturity and inexperience, to grasp the results.

Does the military provide sound (strategic) advice to civilian decision-makers? Even traditionalist observers of civil-military relations who subscribe to the view that the proper preserve of the military is narrowly circumscribed military advice must answer no. Whatever Gen. Petraeus may say or eventually accomplish, the desultory U.S. performance to date in Iraq and Afghanistan is an outgrowth of failed military advice from senior officers unable to rise above their tactical and technical conditioning. In fact, deep-seated anti-intellectualism and an attendant institutional bias for action have prompted those in uniform to seek comfort in tactical and technical thinking, and thereby robbed them of the capacity to think strategically.

Is the military politically neutral? That is, are its personnel sufficiently divorced from involvement in, or undue influence by, partisan politics that they do not compromise the objectivity expected of them? Are they similarly neutral on ideological, religious and cultural grounds? The answer, in all cases, is no. Consider the increasing tendency of retired generals and admirals to endorse political candidates; the outspokenness of the retired generals who called for the ouster of then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (after they had their pensions safely in hand); the willingness of the military to let its units and personnel be repeatedly used as political props by the commander in chief; even the emergence of outspoken lower-ranking active-duty antiwar groups such as “Appeal for Redress From the War in Iraq.” Consider as well the pronounced conservative bias (and Republican political preferences) of most in uniform; the increasing religiosity of service personnel (ranging from Lt. Gen. William G. Boykin, the No. 2 intelligence official in the Pentagon, to evangelical Christians at the Air Force Academy); the deeply entrenched institutional bias against and persistent persecution of homosexuals in uniform, legitimized most recently by the anti-gay remarks of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Peter Pace; the disturbing presence of neo-Nazi skinhead extremists in military units, documented in July 2006 by the Southern Poverty Law Center.

Is the military socially responsible? Traditionalists commonly argue that the military cannot afford to be a test bed for social experimentation. Nonetheless, as a major institution of society, the military is obligated to be socially responsible. That means, among other things, being demographically, experientially and ideologically representative of society. Today’s military is not representative—at least in the sense that neither the country’s political, economic and media elite nor their offspring serve in uniform.

Being socially responsible means being affordable. At a gluttonous cost of $700 billion a year, more than the gross domestic product of all but 17 of the world’s countries, the U.S. military clearly is not affordable—especially if the spurious notion that we are embroiled in an endless “long war” retains political traction.

Being socially responsible means being willing to dissent responsibly—to speak up and speak out—without open or surreptitious disobedience to proper military authority. The deeply ingrained ethos of obedience, the widespread careerist motivation to seek higher rank, the tendency to promote dutiful followers at the expense of assertive leaders, and the principle of political neutrality all have nurtured habits of unquestioning acquiescence among senior officers who should, but don’t, exercise their responsibility for checking and balancing civilian strategic shortcomings.

Being socially responsible means being morally superior—walking the talk of moral propriety. Too many in uniform today are convinced that they are morally superior to an otherwise decadent society. But such moral arrogance is undeserved in light of the hundreds of incidents of aberrant behavior by military personnel each year. Military claims that episodes such as Abu Ghraib and Haditha are unrepresentative of an otherwise morally superior military simply do not hold up in the face of persistent evidence to the contrary.

The rest of the story

Beyond the foregoing, the U.S. military almost invariably precipitates rather than prevents crisis; feeds perceptions abroad of American arrogance and hypocrisy, while undermining U.S. credibility and legitimacy; threatens, in single-mindedly providing for the common defense, other important dimensions of security (liberty, justice, the general welfare); and permits itself to be an instrument for the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. In short, it is strategically dysfunctional.

Add to this the following, and it is indeed a recipe for crisis: consistently unsound strategic advice from senior military leaders; strategically inept civilian officials, executive and legislative, who have turned the hallowed principle of civilian control into civilian subjugation; a civically apathetic public that has acceded to uncompromising military demands for secrecy and failed to responsibly oversee the military’s overseers; an uncritical press that has declined to exact transparency and accountability from the military and its overseers; a weak, fragmented civil society, typified by a largely moribund anti-war movement; and a military-industrial complex whose overweening influence on policymakers and policies has fed militarism and corruption.

Given this state of affairs, no longer can we, the people, give a free pass to a military institution that expects unconditional appreciation, unequivocal support, unquestioning trust, unlimited discretionary license and the absence of “meddling” by “amateurs.” Nor can we blindly trust those who profess to oversee the military on our behalf. The strategic price for doing so is one we cannot afford.

• subscribe to print magazine

  First Name Last Name Home Address City State Zip Code Email

  2-year, 24-issues, $44.95 1-year, 12-issue, $24.95

• stay in touch with our email newsletter

  Subscribe to our regular weekly e-mail newsletter. It's packed with updates on recent and upcoming stories, events, campaigns and things every progressive should be informed about. Check out a sample.

   

• email this article to a friend

  Your Name Your Email Recipient Email

  Personal message Thought you might be interested in this article from In These Times.

   

  Please help us prevent spam by verifying the word you see in the image above

  Send to multiple recipients. Just separate each email address with a comma.

• Reader Comments

  This crisis is more akin to a lymphoma or termite infestation ...

  Termite infestation, guaranteed.  Only a wooden-headed Progressive could find a problem which is “(l)argely unrecognized by the American public, unacknowledged by those in power, and denied by professionals in uniform” and which has no symptoms, as described in detail in the second paragraph of the article.

  The American public is solidly behind the US Military, while respect for politicians is extremely low.  So, Foster sees a problem with the military that no one else sees?  Say what?  So what?

  The Progressives made a massive bet against the United States and its institutions, including the United States military, when they tried to upset the election and validity of President Bush and his policies against terrorism, policies that many Progressives voted for, including Clinton, Kerry, Biden, and Dodd.

  The Progressives are now losing that bet.  Panic time!  Change the subject!  Invent a problem that will cover the Progressives’ lack of progress, and blame it on the US military, the most respected public institution in the country.

  Posted by scorp on Aug 5, 2007 at 2:48 AM

  Dr. Gregory D. Foster

  Background:
  Gregory D. Foster is Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., where he previously has served as George C. Marshall Professor and J. Carlton Ward Distinguished Professor and Director of Research. He also is Executive Director of the Defense Environmental Forum, a joint venture between the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment) and the President of the National Defense University.

  During his tenure at the Industrial College, he has served as director of the Elements of National Power course, the Values, Ethics, and Leadership program, the New Faculty Development program, and the Environment Industry Study group, while also teaching executive-level courses in political science, ethics, mobilization, national power, environmental security, social issues and national security, and strategic brainstorming.

  A West Point graduate and former regular army officer, Mr. Foster holds a doctorate in public administration from The George Washington University. He has held adjunct faculty appointments at The Johns Hopkins University and The American University, where he has taught graduate courses in business ethics, management science, and public management. He has published widely in the areas of national security affairs, civil-military relations, ethics, public management, and futures research. His publications include The Strategic Dimension of Military Manpower (Ballinger, 1987) and Paradoxes of Power: The Military Establishment in the Eighties (Indiana University Press, 1983).

  Prior to joining the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Mr. Foster served as the first director of the National Defense University’s Command and Control Research Program. Before that, he held a number of research management posts in the private sector, including Director of Research and Manager of Washington Operations for the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Director of the Center for Security and Policy Studies, Science Applications, Inc.

  Functional Expertise:
  Public Administration, Organizational Theory and Behavior, Civil-Military Relations, Ethics, Environmental Security, Mobilization, Emergency Management, Strategy, Training/Education

  Regional Expertise:
  Europe, Asia-Pacific

  “Wooden-headed progressive”...?  I don’t think so, Dumbo

  Posted by Major Major on Aug 5, 2007 at 8:42 AM

  MM -

  Every Progressive academic has impressive credentials and a wooden head.  Ask Ward Churchill.  Many people in positions of authority and responsibility are functional idiots.  I first recognized this in the Army, and, to my surprise, discovered that the same thing was true in business, where you might think that the need for markets and profits might serve to discipline the organization.  But no, there are idiots in business, as well as in the military.  So, the first thing you have to do is to learn to distinguish the idiots from the non-idiots.

  You particularly want to avoid those idiots who have a hidden agenda, such as Progressives, who have conveniently labeled themselves for us. 

  Progressives are big on nuance and meta-narratives, where they can describe things that are not obvious, to their own benefit, and to the detriment of the rest of us.  Read the first two paragraphs of this article again.

  So, why are we engaged in a discussion of the hidden relationship between military and civil affairs?  In terms of American casualties, civilian casualties, and costs as a percentage of GDP, the Afghanistan-Iraq War is the most brilliantly successful military undertaking in history.  The Middle East has the most concentrated ethnic, political, and economic conflicts in the world so it is vital that democracy prevail, and the conflicts of the centuries is ended. 

  But that is not what the Progressive meta-narrative tells us.  (Note the Abu-Ghraib illustration for this article, a two-bit piece of foolishness for which the handful of perpetrators and negligent supervisors [idiots] have paid, and which should have been a minor footnote in history.  Instead, it has become the most celebrated [by Progressives] event of the War).

  Why are the Progressives lying to us about our brilliant success, and why are they in such a panic as that success becomes more obvious?  Why is Foster trying to create an artificial conflict between the military and civilians, when the military is the most respected public institution in the nation?

  The Collectivists, now calling themselves Progressives, have been trying to gain world-wide domination since the Communist Revolution in Russia in the early part of the Twentieth Century.  Every time they gain power, they make a hash of it, but they are still trying.  Telling lies is one of their political tactics, as Foster illustrates.

  Posted by scorp on Aug 5, 2007 at 11:06 AM

  Rather than comment on the specifics of Foster’s points, scorp immediately veers into the partisan kneejerk by talking about Progressives. Foster didn’t mention them nor actual political parties. His points are about how functional militaries have acted previously and how far off those precedents our present-day military - and surrounding institutions - have become.

  He concludes that we should not give it free passes, nor give blind trust to its overseers (our government and press) because doing so comes at an unaffordable price.

  When you’ve been around the military life for many decades, your perspectives are based upon comparative experiences of how it has performed at its best and worst. It doesn’t require a party or ideological filter to note major signs of increasing trouble.

  One example: despite limiting press access far more than occurred in Vietnam, despite an unusually low number of mainstream media correspondents inside Iraq, far more stories have emerged about criminal acts committed by soldiers and groups of soldiers than were reported in Vietnam. And that previous war was more than twice as long with 4 or 5 as many soldiers deployed.

  That does suggest a breakdown in training and command structure. And that reporting has barely scratched what has gone on as a result of outsourcing to mercenaries and private contractors, where command lines and oversight are far thinner.

  Go talk to the middle managers who run the day to day of the Army, the sergeants. Ask them if they see the trouble signs Foster does. Do so objectively, without adding your partisan filter.

  We can and must be able to handle the truth. History’s full of powerful nations that have fallen, not because they were defeated in battle by superior firepower, but simply because they were decayed within by segments of their societies that put other interests above the central one of providing sound, thoroughly reviewed strategy and executing it efficiently.

  One can choose to remain willfully blind to the areas he describes where troubling signs and patterns have emerged. But doing so imperils the country, which all of us - military and civilian - have a vested interest in, the highest vested interest of all.

  Should we risk losing our country by casting such debates and reviews into partisan waters? Note that Foster never suggested where the beginnings of the faultlines occurred. He’s not saying this is Bush’s fault, nor Clinton’s, nor any prior administration. He’s simply saying where we have gotten ourselves to and that it’s dysfunctional and dangerous to let such dysfunctions continue to exist and grow.

  Posted by Kevin Hayden on Aug 5, 2007 at 11:50 AM

  Forster has an impressive resumé.

  However, he makes some pretty sweeping allegations and a cheap shots at “...retired generals who called for the ouster of then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (after they had their pensions safely in hand)”

  If they were retired then, yes they would have a pension wouldn’t they. Should they then give it back? Keep quiet? What’s his point with this comment?

  Others gave their opinions and were ignored? I saw no mention of them.
  If Foster is still at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. is his pension safely in hand or is he going to refuse it as some dramatic, yet futile gesture?

  As always at the first opportunity politicians lop off manpower and did so with the fall of the Soviet Union as with V-E Day and V-J Day and the War to End Wars.

  They were sent on a massive crusade to democratize an assortment of religious extremists, tribal oriented nomads wearing phony nationalistic labels stuck on nearly a century ago — hardly the mission our military was trained for.

  Why blame the military? They are shorthanded, short on training for the mission, and have been short on supplies since they got there.

  Why blame the Christians within the military? The most radical religious bunch now held in Gitmo allege a disrespect for their holy book and the media scream “foul!” But a general expresses his own personal religious view on individual sexual preferences and Foster can’t let it drop.

  With his… “Functional Expertise: Public Administration, Organizational Theory and Behavior, Civil-Military Relations, Ethics, Environmental Security, Mobilization, Emergency Management, Strategy, Training/Education”

  ...Foster is in a position to either make the needed changes within the organization or — perhaps accept part of the blame for what he sees as the military’s major failings.

  What does he expect of us?

  Posted by whattheheck on Aug 5, 2007 at 3:03 PM

• extended discussion >>>Continued...

  Discussions with more than 5 comments are continued on our special discussion page to encourage continuity and ease of use. There are currently 29 posts.

Member Login

Also by Gregory D. Foster

• General Failure
  An enduring crisis in civil-military relations threatens America's future
• Route-Stepping? Our Way to WWIII
  Scare-tactic allusions to war allow Bush to push an extremist agenda.

Your financial support of In These Times is critical, because as a non-profit, we rely on donors like you who know that In These Times will never cede the debate to the right and its corporate allies.

Donate now and get a Kurt Vonnegut mug or t-shirt!