Features » July 17, 2007
Tranche Warfare
Who will be left holding the bag as subprime mortgages go bad?
By Dave Mulcahey
The greatest boom in property values since record-keeping began has produced a population more in debt, and with less equity, than before it all got going.
Now that the real estate bubble seems poised to go the way of its dot-com predecessor, a new narrative has taken hold in the business press. Where once reporters breathlessly touted double-digit, year-on-year gains in home prices, they now warn darkly of the “meltdown” underway in the class of exotic mortgages that added so much punch to the party.
After months of dismal reports for the real estate industry—declining sales, rising inventories, softening prices, rising foreclosure rates—the news took a sharp turn for the worse in late June, when the investment bank Bear Stearns shut down two hedge funds whose holdings were laden with securities backed by subprime mortgages.
Suddenly, finance pundits and insiders were speculating about just how far the damage of bad subprime loans would spread. Could it be “contained”? Were more hedge funds on the verge of implosion? Was the debacle about to touch off a system-wide credit crunch?
Meanwhile, a bemused public was wondering what the rarefied world of hedge funds had to do a bunch of poor suckers who had bought more house than they could afford. How many of these loans could there be—and how many defaults—that a Wall Street powerhouse like Bear Stearns was taking it on the chops? And what’s the story behind all these subprime loans, anyway? Whose idea was all that funky lending?
The insiders’ questions have yet to be answered. But for financial naifs, the Bear Stearns imbroglio was highly instructive. It briefly pulled back the curtain to reveal the machinations behind the mountain of mortgage debt the American peasantry has piled up during the great housing bubble. Subprime lending in the United States rose from $35 billion annually in 1994 to $625 billion in 2005. A shocking proportion of this financing was extended on the flimsiest pretenses of due diligence by lenders, and carried terms and conditions sure to ruin a large number of borrowers. According to Fannie Mae, between $1.1 and $2.2 trillion in adjustable-rate mortgages will reset to higher rates in 2007. Another $1.4 to $2.4 trillion will reset in 2008—half of it subprime and another quarter less than prime. It’s difficult to see how that will end well. Yet for a while, the bubble seemed like some millennial, never-ending win-win scenario.
By now it should be apparent to most Americans that we’re beyond the George Bailey model of mortgage lending, in which banks and other mortgage lenders hold on to the loans they write. Most mortgage paper nowadays is instantly sold, and the buyers are the big Wall Street investment banks, which repackage it as mortgage-backed securities and various “structured finance” products (such as the gizmo that got Bear Stearns into trouble, the “collateralized debt obligation” or CDO). The point of “securitizing” home loans is easy enough to understand: It takes an illiquid obligation—Joe Doaks’ mortgage—and, by pooling it with similar debt, transforms it into a fungible, liquid security that can be rated for creditworthiness and sold to institutional investors.
Many institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies and so forth, are restricted from buying debt unless it’s investment-grade—that is, debt with a rating of BBB or better (the rating expresses default risk, not value). And here is where the genius of structured-finance products like CDOs comes into play. These securities can pool quite unsavory debt—subprime mortgages, for example—and repackage it in ways so that at least some of it will be suitable for the more choosy investors mentioned above.
They do this by dividing the pool into segments, called tranches. The senior tranche might carry the highest rating (AAA), while the “mezzanine” tranche carries AA to BBB. The lowest segment, the so-called equity tranche, is typically unrated. Again, the entire pool might be made up of shaky loans — downright dodgy ones, in fact — but the senior tranche may still merit the AAA rating because it always claims priority of payment. It gets the first dollar of cash flow, while the lowest tranche takes the first dollar of loss. Because most borrowers—even subprime ones—pay their mortgages, money managers can buy AAA tranches with a relative degree of confidence.
Theoretically, that is. But more about that in a moment.
More information about Dave Mulcahey
-
subscribe to print magazine
-
email this article to a friend
-
Reader Comments
-
register a new account »Posting Security
Appeared in the August 2007 Issue
Also featured
Risking Everything for Europe
The Subprime Bait and Switch
The New Children’s Crusade
Full contents
Previous issues
Subscribe and save!
Also by Dave Mulcahey
- Hooray for Hookergate!
On April 27, Republicans awoke to a PR disaster. Tucked away on page… morePosted on May 15, 2006 - Passion of the Right
The uses of persecutionPosted on October 5, 2004 - Another World, Possibly
Shortly before he died in 1918, the American critic Randolph Bourne penned an… morePosted on August 17, 2004 - The Wise Many
Connoisseurs of the Strangelovian may recall last summer’s dustup over a plan hatched… morePosted on July 6, 2004 - Design Flaw
On the edge of the Chicago suburb of Barrington is a massive edifice… morePosted on January 2, 2004
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
Ignoring Outrage, Obama Set to Expand Pentagon Presence in Colombia
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
