Features » May 24, 2006
Why Exiting Iraq Wont Be Easy (cont’d)
On April 3, Iraqi men and U.S. soldiers gather at the site of a car bomb explosion in Sadr City, on the outskirts of Baghdad.
Al-Khafaji goes so far as to aver: “No serious Iraqi—whether Sunni, Shiite or Kurd—really wants a U.S. withdrawal.” He notes that the only major Shiite leader to demand an immediate end to the occupation is populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The cleric commands the allegiance of the ragtag Mahdi Army, which is suspected of involvement in political assassinations and has proudly enforced the law of the gun, torching liquor stores and imposing “Islamic” dress on women, in southern cities like Basra and Nasiriyya, as well as in parts of the capital. Al-Khafaji says Sadr’s anti-occupation stance should be decoded as follows: “Yes, please leave and give our militias freedom of maneuver!”
Yet the United States seems to be doing very little to stop the civil war that its continued presence is supposed to prevent. The military failed to intervene in the street fighting that followed the Askariyya shrine bombing, for example. Indeed, the military’s predicament is that it cannot intervene, because then it would appear to be taking sides more than the United States has done already.
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When Washington realizes it can no longer stay the course, what will withdrawal look like? Barring complete disaster, it will not resemble the headlong flight conjured by the phrase “cutting and running.” As Jeffrey White, former chief of Middle East military assessments for the Defense Intelligence Agency, puts it: “We want to get out, but not like we got out of Beirut or Saigon.”
From the Pentagon’s perspective, a helter-skelter withdrawal is the option of last resort. According to Wayne White, for the past two years, security concerns have impelled the military to airlift both troops and heavy equipment instead of using rail freight or large road convoys, meaning that the enormous planes built for transcontinental flights are used for in-country travel. But there are simply not enough planes to effect a precipitous pullout. A number of units would be forced to leave the country in land convoys, which could be attacked by either insurgents seeking to press their point or, White suggests, “some very angry people who thought you were going to stay.” While such fighting would be brief, heavy U.S. casualties would be possible. “Phased is the way to go,” White says. “Abrupt is not.”
Since the logistics dictate a phased operation anyway, the cognoscenti have been sketching exit strategies in which the U.S. departure would also help Iraq’s internal divisions to heal. The impulse is admirable, but it may be too late.
In a Financial Times op-ed, President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, proposed that “Washington should quietly ask Iraqi leaders to publicly ask the U.S. to leave” and then consult with those leaders on a timetable. Brzezinski believes that many Iraqi politicians would welcome the opportunity to pose to the Iraqi people as self-liberators, and two years ago, before the civil war began, he might have been right.
He also glibly dismisses those who do “not wish to ask the U.S. to leave. They are the ones who would leave when we leave, which says something about the depth of their domestic support.” But at the moment, this category encompasses not just the feckless Chalabi, but also the Shiite religious parties, who won a near majority in the National Assembly in the December 2005 elections, the twin Kurdish parties, and a significant number of Sunni Arabs who U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad “brought back in” to formal politics. There is unlikely to be a unified Iraqi government that would want the United States to leave.
That could lead to the through-the-looking-glass scenario, with Washington bullying the Iraqi government into asking U.S. forces to leave. The United States could threaten to stop training the new Iraqi army or withhold aid money if the militias were not reined in and a timetable not drawn up. In this scenario, the Shiite religious parties—out of fear of losing everything they have gained since the fall of Saddam—might also relinquish the security apparatus and negotiate in good faith with Sunni Arabs and secular nationalists over revisions to the constitution passed in October 2005. The Kurds, fearing Turkish intervention if they did not curtail their ambitions, might abandon their quest to add oil-rich Kirkuk to their northern autonomous zone.
Realities, again, are harder. Sectarian strife has redoubled every group’s determination to possess both a hand in “national” security forces and their own stockpile of arms. The Shiite parties are divided internally over the federalism provisions of the constitution, and their own negotiations could take the form of militia activity. The Kurds have been settling the environs of Kirkuk, and they do not plan to leave. They can assuage Turkey’s concerns by kicking out the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters who are now using northern Iraq as a base for a low-grade insurgency in heavily Kurdish southeastern Turkey. It is outside the scope of U.S. power to tame all the furies unleashed by the invasion.
The U.S. occupation may no longer be the biggest cause of violence in Iraq, but it is still one of the causes, and it cannot be the cure. The one partial blessing the United States can bestow on Iraq is to remove itself from the equation, and chances are it will have to do so unilaterally. No one should pretend, however, that this would be a noble course of action or a panacea for Iraq’s ills. It would only be a very bad decision necessitated by the even worse decisions that were made before.
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Appeared in the June 2006 Issue
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