Features > April 30, 2007
Duck and Cover (cont’d)
Upgrading nuclear capabilities
Under Complex 2030, the NNSA is taking steps to boost the U.S. ability to test and produce new warheads, and to consolidate production of uranium, plutonium and non-nuclear components within nuclear weapons.
The central component of Complex 2030 is the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. The official rationale for the RRW program is to produce weapons that are safer and more durable than the warheads in the current stockpile. Supporters of RRW fear that the components of nuclear weapons could wear out and that the only way to know if the warheads are viable is to replace their inner workings. And—the line of thinking continues—as long as scientists are replacing the plutonium or uranium cores, they might as well “tweak” the weapon’s design.
But the assertion that the old nuclear weapons need to be replaced by reliable new warheads is undermined by a recent NNSA study that indicates that the existing plutonium triggers, or “pits,” may be viable for another 90 to 100 years. The report, issued in November and reviewed by an independent panel of scientists and academics, indicates the need for considerable skepticism of the Complex 2030 claims.
In addition, the RRW program will establish the infrastructure needed for future development of new warheads with new capabilities. A key element of this upgraded and consolidated nuclear infrastructure is a new facility to produce “pits,” the plutonium triggers that set off the explosion of a hydrogen bomb. The DOE has proposed constructing a Modern Pit Facility, but Congress has deemed the $2 to $4 billion price tag too steep, and has rejected funding proposals for two years running.
As an alternative, the department is pushing the idea of a Consolidated Plutonium Center (CPC) that would bring all of the plutonium-related activities together at one site. The new facility would be a sort of “modern pit facility-plus,” capable each year of producing 125 plutonium pits to trigger nuclear weapons, and at the same time develop new military applications for plutonium. This more expansive concept is likely to cost more than the facility alone, but NNSA has yet to provide a cost estimate to Congress. A small down payment for the CPC—$24.9 million—is proposed in the FY 2008 budget; budget projections for continuing work on the CPC total $282 million through 2012.
Under Complex 2030, the new CPC will be one of a series “transformed” and “consolidated” nuclear sites. Currently, there are eight facilities—Los Alamos National Laboratory (N.M.), Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (Calif.) and Sandia National Laboratories (N.M.), the Nevada Test Site (R&D activities, including sub-critical experiments), the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant in Tennessee (uranium and other components), the Pantex Plant in Texas (warhead assembly, disassembly, disposal), the Kansas City Plant (non-nuclear components), and the Savannah River Site (tritium extraction and handling) in Georgia.
While Complex 2030 would mandate that some of the sites have a smaller “footprint” (less floor space), it would also require the investment of tens of billions of dollars for new or upgraded factories, including two new factories—a Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF) and a Uranium Processing Facility (UPF)—at the Y-12 site; a new Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory to “support plutonium operations”; a new factory for the production of non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons at the current site of the Kansas City plant; and significant upgrades at the Pantex warhead assembly/disassembly facility. The spending on the CPC is only a small portion of the as yet unknown costs of the Complex 2030 initiative.
Broken pledges, skeptical Congress
All of this raises concerns for Robert Civiak. A program examiner for Department of Energy national security programs in 1988 and 1989, Civiak now does research for Tri-Valley Cares, a group that advocates the elimination of nuclear weapons. He calls the Reliable Replacement Warhead a “multibillion dollar effort to redesign and replace every nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal.” Jay Coghlan, executive director at Nuclear Watch of New Mexico, agrees, calling RRW a “nukes forever program, and a Trojan horse for future new designs.”
NNSA’s planning documents call for the production of the first RRW by 2012, and according to analysis by James Sterngold in the San Francisco Chronicle, the work is already beginning. He writes, “Lab officials said researchers not only have produced extensive designs … but they have already conducted non-nuclear tests of the critical detonation devices and other components. They have begun to plan in detail how the weapons would be manufactured.”
Rep. Pete Visclosky (D-Ind.), the new chairman of the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, has criticized the RRW project for its “make-it-up-as-you-go-along” approach. “There appears to have been little thought given to the question of why the United States needs to build new nuclear warheads at this time,” he says. “My preference is that the DOE would have spent their resources reconfiguring the old Cold War complex and dismantling obsolete warheads.” He has not ruled out slowing or eliminating the RRW if the administration is unable to present a strategy “that defines the future mission, the emerging threats and the specific U.S. nuclear stockpile necessary to achieve strategic goals.”
The 110th Congress and beyond
In an August 2005 speech to a symposium on post-cold war nuclear strategy, Rep. Hobson described the administration’s call for research on new bombs and the Nuclear Earth Penetrator as “very provocative and overly aggressive policies that undermine our moral authority to argue that other nations should forgo nuclear weapons.”
Hobson’s concerns are shared by a number of his colleagues on the other side of the aisle, including Reps. Ed Markey (D-Mass.), John Spratt (D-S.C.) and Lynne Woolsey (D-Calif.), all of whom joined him in successfully leading an effort to defund the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. Skepticism about the need for massive investment in nuclear weapons at a time of huge war bills and growing deficits, a growing sophistication about nuclear issues, and a Democratic majority means that for the first time in years the nuclear weapons complex is feeling the heat.
Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) represents the state that houses the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which recently won the Reliable Replacement Warhead competition. In a press release issued after the decision, she said, “While I appreciate the fact that Lawrence Livermore was selected, this in no way answers my questions about the Reliable Replacement Warhead program”—a program that she remains “100 percent opposed to.”
Despite support from the White House, the DOE, key contractors, and a number of powerful members of Congress such as Sen. Pete Domenici (R-N.M.), Rep. Zach Wamp (R-Tenn.) and Rep. Joe Barton (R-Texas)—all of whom have nuclear weapons facilities in their states or districts—the Complex 2030 plan to modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure may be scaled back or rejected by congressional opponents, who will receive backing from arms control and environmental organizations. But it will take more than cutting a million here or a billion there, more than gunning against a specific corner of the Complex 2030 plan, more than defunding the most aggressive or alarming aspects of the nuclear weapons complex, to deal with nuclear weapons in the 21st century. Members of Congress are going to need to challenge the bedrock of administration foreign policy—that nuclear weapons should occupy center stage as a guarantor of U.S. security.
But they will not do that without being pushed—and pushed hard—by civil society. The urgency of the task creates opportunities for a big tent of strange bedfellows to work together: Weary cold warriors like George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, who in January co-authored a Wall Street Journal op-ed titled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”; well-established Washington organizations like the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Arms Control Association; disarmament activists like Helen Caldicott and the Abolition 2000 network; and members of the international community from the United Nations on down are all saying the same thing: The United States cannot insist that other nations disarm or opt not to pursue nuclear technology, while aggressively ramping up U.S. nuclear capabilities. This hypocrisy cannot stand.
Global security through nuclear disarmament or a world awash in nuclear weapons. The choice is obvious. And it is ours to make.
More information about William D. Hartung and Frida Berrigan
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Also by William D. Hartung and Frida Berrigan
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