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I thought I might respond to Jefferson Decker’s thoughtful review of The New Victorians—actually, it’s only the final two paragraphs I want to take issue with, paragraphs in which he suggests how my argument, as he lays it out, might be qualified and complicated. I am in full agreement, so much so that I addressed these issues in the book itself, though perhaps not as clearly as I might have. Let me try to clarify, since Decker raises good, and I think important, questions.
Decker is right to suggest that contemporary opposition to welfare was more broadly rooted than merely among anti-welfare business conservatives. That’s in part the puzzle I set out to answer in The New Victorians. Opposition to welfare was widespread in the late twentieth century, just as it had been in the late nineteenth century, just as it has been throughout most all of American (and world) history. The puzzle is why only at these two moments in American political history was anti-relief sentiment able to mobilize a widespread roll-back of benefits. The argument I make in The New Victorians is that only when that opposition was institutionalized (in nineteenth century Charity Organization Societies and twentieth century think tanks) and it thereby found entrée into the policy making apparatus was it able to dominate policy debate and change policy itself. That’s also part of why I pay so much attention to the manner in which a few nineteenth century cities were able to resist these powerful reform efforts, thanks to the institutionalized resilience and inertia of certain relief agencies, the mobilized resistance of poor and working people, and pro-relief propaganda from competing elites.
Decker is also right that welfare alone was not the target; but again, this forms a key thread in my narrative—because of the vulnerabilities in its political support and the structural failings of AFDC that he reminds us of (which New Victorians does, too) I argue that AFDC was merely a first target in a bigger and bolder class war, an effort that is raging now to return us to pre-Progressive Era notions of the appropriate role of the state, to do no less than undo the Great Society and the New Deal. Social Security has not been repealed, it is true, but surely we can see the ways in which Democrats and Republicans alike contemplate various schemes of privatization, unthinkable (at least for Democrats) twenty years ago; unlike AFDC, because of Social Security’s strong political support and its structural, institutionalized resilience, it is a much more difficult target for rollback. But it is a target, and the campaign against welfare helped soften the ground for this much larger battle, something Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan saw clearly upon welfare reform’s passage. And I hardly need point out the state of environmental, and workplace health and safety regulations. Or new overtime regs. Or progressive tax policy. And so on.
As for the suggestion that The New Victorians pay more attention to the middle-ground of public opinion, I must confess to being at something at a loss, that being at the very heart of the book – to show the ways in which conservative think tanks successfully shaped public understandings about and discourse over welfare, pushed credible social science data out of the debate, and the ways in which misconceptions came to appear in polled public opinion, then from the mouths of both Democratic and Republic policy makers, and then in policy itself. Sure, there were legitimate liberal complaints about welfare – it was a deeply flawed program, especially from the perspective of those who depended upon it (as David Ellwood put it, “Everyone hates welfare”). But those voices are not the ones that dominated debate and shaped policy reform, and thus play a very small role in my story (as I think they should, though we could disagree about that).
Finally, we do need to think in a more sophisticated fashion about how to structure social welfare programs that are more resilient to attack, as Decker urges. But that is not enough, for as the first Gilded Age’s battles over relief show, institutional resilience is not likely to be sufficient – only when grassroots mobilization in defense of relief was joined with elite rhetorical defense of strong welfare programs were anti-welfare campaigns beaten back. That offers a lesson for us today, as I tried to show in The New Victorians.
Posted by Stephen Pimpare on Sep 13, 2004 at 9:33 AM
Is the idea we should support everyone who does not work? That work itself should be optional?
From what i can tell, most people (all?) are basically lazy. They do what they need to do to survive. The ability to survive has gotten much easier in the last hundred years. Now people in the US in the “povery” zone basically all have color tvs, cars, vcrs, enough food to eat etc (ok, there are some exceoptions but this applies to the large majority, according to all the studies i have read). This is not poverty, at least not by historical standards (remember the potato famine - now that was poverty!).
The problem here is that too many people have a desire to have a standard of living that is just too high. We should all reduce our personal standards of living. I will start now - from now on, i will live on 75% of my means. And as time goes on, i will decrease my expenses.
If everyone in the US does this (or everyone with a per capita income of over $10K anyway), it will benefit the environment, the energy problems and many other problems. We are all living too high on the hog - it is time to readjust to a more modest life style.
Posted by man on Sep 14, 2004 at 1:31 PM
If everyone reduced by 25% their consumption of appliances, automobiles and gas, clothes, food, and assorted sundries, what does ‘man’ think the effect would be on the economy? On US manufacturers, on foreign exporters to the US, on the balance of trade, etc.?
Posted by Johnny on Sep 15, 2004 at 6:23 AM
Johnny - all changes can cause bad side effects. But if we (the US and other developed countries) continue to increase consumption over the next 100 years at the current rate, what do you think will happen?
The point is that we are heading off a cliff, being driven by greed. We can either fix the problem now or continue on our merry way. If we continue as we are, imagine the environmental effects and the social consequences (distribution of wealth issues come to mind).
We as a nation are all a bit too fat and too happy. Even the poor (have you noticed how obese they are, especially in the US?). Used to be that the rich were fat - now it is the other way around. . .
Posted by man on Sep 15, 2004 at 6:33 AM
Why is it that people resent giving to the poor and no one complains about what the Senators and Congressmen take? They have fixed it so that they get everything. Lots of perks that the poor never dream of. We were actually better off when people went into factories to work. Everyone worked. Not many were on welfare. Now people either work for the government, a contractor or go into the military. Places like Walmart and the military encourage people to apply for food stamps. What’s wrong with this?
Posted by Jean Scott on Sep 16, 2004 at 5:25 AM
Jean - People resent giving out charity to lazy people who do not take responsibility for themselves. Thus the stereotype of promiscuous poor single mothers getting pregnant over and over again and the mess being picked up the the taxpayer. This resentment is made even stronger, since the working class is fully aware that one *can* and *does* get ahead by working hard and delaying gratification. Perhaps some of the resentment on the other side (towards the congresspeople you mention, for instance) is due to the lack of a fair playing field - that is, being born rich is not “fair”. But then again, neither is being born smart, athletic, etc. Fundamentally, life is not fair! As we grow up, we hopefully learn to accept this rather obvious fact. . .
Posted by sinceYouAsked on Sep 16, 2004 at 7:39 AM
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Reader Comments
I thought I might respond to Jefferson Decker’s thoughtful review of The New Victorians—actually, it’s only the final two paragraphs I want to take issue with, paragraphs in which he suggests how my argument, as he lays it out, might be qualified and complicated. I am in full agreement, so much so that I addressed these issues in the book itself, though perhaps not as clearly as I might have. Let me try to clarify, since Decker raises good, and I think important, questions.
Decker is right to suggest that contemporary opposition to welfare was more broadly rooted than merely among anti-welfare business conservatives. That’s in part the puzzle I set out to answer in The New Victorians. Opposition to welfare was widespread in the late twentieth century, just as it had been in the late nineteenth century, just as it has been throughout most all of American (and world) history. The puzzle is why only at these two moments in American political history was anti-relief sentiment able to mobilize a widespread roll-back of benefits. The argument I make in The New Victorians is that only when that opposition was institutionalized (in nineteenth century Charity Organization Societies and twentieth century think tanks) and it thereby found entrée into the policy making apparatus was it able to dominate policy debate and change policy itself. That’s also part of why I pay so much attention to the manner in which a few nineteenth century cities were able to resist these powerful reform efforts, thanks to the institutionalized resilience and inertia of certain relief agencies, the mobilized resistance of poor and working people, and pro-relief propaganda from competing elites.
Decker is also right that welfare alone was not the target; but again, this forms a key thread in my narrative—because of the vulnerabilities in its political support and the structural failings of AFDC that he reminds us of (which New Victorians does, too) I argue that AFDC was merely a first target in a bigger and bolder class war, an effort that is raging now to return us to pre-Progressive Era notions of the appropriate role of the state, to do no less than undo the Great Society and the New Deal. Social Security has not been repealed, it is true, but surely we can see the ways in which Democrats and Republicans alike contemplate various schemes of privatization, unthinkable (at least for Democrats) twenty years ago; unlike AFDC, because of Social Security’s strong political support and its structural, institutionalized resilience, it is a much more difficult target for rollback. But it is a target, and the campaign against welfare helped soften the ground for this much larger battle, something Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan saw clearly upon welfare reform’s passage. And I hardly need point out the state of environmental, and workplace health and safety regulations. Or new overtime regs. Or progressive tax policy. And so on.
As for the suggestion that The New Victorians pay more attention to the middle-ground of public opinion, I must confess to being at something at a loss, that being at the very heart of the book – to show the ways in which conservative think tanks successfully shaped public understandings about and discourse over welfare, pushed credible social science data out of the debate, and the ways in which misconceptions came to appear in polled public opinion, then from the mouths of both Democratic and Republic policy makers, and then in policy itself. Sure, there were legitimate liberal complaints about welfare – it was a deeply flawed program, especially from the perspective of those who depended upon it (as David Ellwood put it, “Everyone hates welfare”). But those voices are not the ones that dominated debate and shaped policy reform, and thus play a very small role in my story (as I think they should, though we could disagree about that).
Finally, we do need to think in a more sophisticated fashion about how to structure social welfare programs that are more resilient to attack, as Decker urges. But that is not enough, for as the first Gilded Age’s battles over relief show, institutional resilience is not likely to be sufficient – only when grassroots mobilization in defense of relief was joined with elite rhetorical defense of strong welfare programs were anti-welfare campaigns beaten back. That offers a lesson for us today, as I tried to show in The New Victorians.
Is the idea we should support everyone who does not work? That work itself should be optional?
From what i can tell, most people (all?) are basically lazy. They do what they need to do to survive. The ability to survive has gotten much easier in the last hundred years. Now people in the US in the “povery” zone basically all have color tvs, cars, vcrs, enough food to eat etc (ok, there are some exceoptions but this applies to the large majority, according to all the studies i have read). This is not poverty, at least not by historical standards (remember the potato famine - now that was poverty!).
The problem here is that too many people have a desire to have a standard of living that is just too high. We should all reduce our personal standards of living. I will start now - from now on, i will live on 75% of my means. And as time goes on, i will decrease my expenses.
If everyone in the US does this (or everyone with a per capita income of over $10K anyway), it will benefit the environment, the energy problems and many other problems. We are all living too high on the hog - it is time to readjust to a more modest life style.
If everyone reduced by 25% their consumption of appliances, automobiles and gas, clothes, food, and assorted sundries, what does ‘man’ think the effect would be on the economy? On US manufacturers, on foreign exporters to the US, on the balance of trade, etc.?
Johnny - all changes can cause bad side effects. But if we (the US and other developed countries) continue to increase consumption over the next 100 years at the current rate, what do you think will happen?
The point is that we are heading off a cliff, being driven by greed. We can either fix the problem now or continue on our merry way. If we continue as we are, imagine the environmental effects and the social consequences (distribution of wealth issues come to mind).
We as a nation are all a bit too fat and too happy. Even the poor (have you noticed how obese they are, especially in the US?). Used to be that the rich were fat - now it is the other way around. . .
Why is it that people resent giving to the poor and no one complains about what the Senators and Congressmen take? They have fixed it so that they get everything. Lots of perks that the poor never dream of. We were actually better off when people went into factories to work. Everyone worked. Not many were on welfare. Now people either work for the government, a contractor or go into the military. Places like Walmart and the military encourage people to apply for food stamps. What’s wrong with this?
Jean - People resent giving out charity to lazy people who do not take responsibility for themselves. Thus the stereotype of promiscuous poor single mothers getting pregnant over and over again and the mess being picked up the the taxpayer. This resentment is made even stronger, since the working class is fully aware that one *can* and *does* get ahead by working hard and delaying gratification. Perhaps some of the resentment on the other side (towards the congresspeople you mention, for instance) is due to the lack of a fair playing field - that is, being born rich is not “fair”. But then again, neither is being born smart, athletic, etc. Fundamentally, life is not fair! As we grow up, we hopefully learn to accept this rather obvious fact. . .
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