Features > March 5, 2007

Counterinsurgency 101

General Petraeus says he thinks the war in Iraq is winnable. His recent manual suggests otherwise.

By Kristian Williams

Iraqi soliders man a checkpoint at the entrance of Sadr City, an impoverished Shiite Muslim neighborhood in Baghdad, on Fed. 6, 2007

A soldier in Baghdad, in town for the “surge” and wondering whether things really are as bad as they seem, might want to read FM 3-24, the U.S. military’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual, released last December. On Page 1-29, our soldier will find a handy table — “Successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational practices” — that outlines the Dos and the Don’ts. (See sidebar.)

In which column would one place the major decisions of the Bush administration? The dissolution of the Iraqi army, the de-Baathification of the civil service, the failure to guard important historic and cultural sites, the granting of reconstruction contracts to American firms, and the long-term neglect of legal due process — all correspond to the advice on the “Don’t” side of the chart. And that’s not accounting for atrocities like those in Falluja, Haditha or Abu Ghraib. The “Dos” column, on the other hand, reads like a list of what the United States has failed to do: meeting the population’s needs, expanding secure areas, politically isolating the insurgents, training and equipping Iraqi forces, securing the borders and so on.

If this table serves as a pocket-sized score card, the 280-page manual is a full-bodied treatise on the subject. This is the first new counterinsurgency field manual to appear in 20 years, and as such, it serves as a tacit admission that the American strategy in Iraq is simply not working. The manual’s perspective takes on additional significance since its chief author, Gen. David Petraeus, has just taken over as the top commander in the war.

Petraeus, who wrote his dissertation at Princeton on the military lessons of the Vietnam War, distinguished himself in Mosul with his hearts-and-minds approach. Shortly after the 2003 invasion, he used the 101st Airborne to establish an overwhelming presence in the city, then promptly instituted foot patrols, held local elections and distributed money for reconstruction. At the year’s end, Mosul was one of the few pacified areas. But Petraeus’ approach ran counter to Rumsfeld’s. At the beginning of 2004, Rumsfeld replaced the Airborne with a Stryker force one-fourth as large. The Stryker Brigade halted the foot patrols and the local government’s efforts. Within a few weeks, Mosul was in chaos. The question facing Petraeus now is whether that process can be reversed — three years later, on a much larger scale, and with a budding civil war. It’s a tough test for the theory set out in his handbook.

Written primarily for “leaders and planners at the battalion level and above,” FM 3-24 sets doctrine for the Army, Marine Corps, Army Reserve and National Guard. It addresses practical, organizational and theoretical dimensions of low-intensity conflict, starting with general principles and then focusing on specific operations. Hence, it begins with a detailed analysis of the nature of insurgencies, which is then followed by chapters on the integration of civilian and military activities, the use of intelligence, the design, execution and sustainment of operations, developing local government forces and ethical constraints.

According to FM 3-24 the ultimate aims of a counterinsurgency program are political — winning legitimacy for the government and undermining the claims of the rebels. Strategically speaking, it is as important to meet the population’s needs as to hunt down the enemy. A counterinsurgency program is, as the manual puts it, “armed social work.”

But mounting a successful counterinsurgency is a dangerous balancing act. Any sign of weakness benefits the insurgents, who will exploit the atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity in their efforts to discredit the government. But if the military is overbearing and oppressive, the insurgents can use public resentment and sincere grievances to gain support and justify violence. It is not enough to win the battles if the government loses the backing of the population in the process.

FM 3-24 does a good job conveying this complexity. It refers repeatedly to the localized, “mosaic” nature of insurgencies, and to their tendency to shift suddenly, unpredictably and often. The guide provides a list of “counterinsurgency paradoxes.” For example: “Sometimes, the More Force Is Used, the Less Effective It Is,” and “Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing.” It practically makes a mantra of the slogan “Learn and Adapt.” It also stresses the need for decision-makers to familiarize themselves with local conditions, the history of the region, the culture and the country’s institutions. While always careful to remind the counterinsurgent of the inevitable role violence plays, the manual especially emphasizes need for political legitimacy.

So along with the tedious details of military organization and procedure, the handbook provides a substantial outline of basic sociological concepts (plus an appendix on “social network analysis”), a political science lecture on the nature of legitimacy and history lessons drawn from American involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, El Salvador and the Philippines; T.E. Lawrence’s Arabian campaign; Mao’s guerilla war in China; and several less famous (or infamous) colonial wars, revolutions, resistance movements and terrorist fights.

Direct discussion of the Iraq war is relatively polite and tends to foreground stories of U.S. military success. But since it is impossible to read the book without the present war in mind, certain implications are nevertheless obvious. There is scant mention of Abu Ghraib, for example, but there are extensive, repeated discussions of the legal, moral and political prohibitions against torture. (An appendix reprints the complete text of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions). There is also a brief retelling of the French experience in Algeria:

During the Algerian war of independence between 1954 and 1962, French leaders decided to permit torture against suspected insurgents. Though they were aware that it was against the law and morality of war, they argued that —

• This was a new form of war and these rules did not apply.
• The threat the enemy represented, communism, was a great evil that justified extraordinary means.
• The application of torture against insurgents was measured and nongratuitous.

This official condoning of torture on the part of French Army leadership had several negative consequences. It empowered the moral legitimacy of the opposition, undermined the French moral legitimacy, and caused internal fragmentation among serving officers that led to an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1962. In the end, failure to comply with moral and legal restrictions against torture severely undermined French efforts and contributed to their loss despite several significant military victories. … France eventually recognized Algerian independence in July 1963.

Under the circumstances, especially given the list of reasons for the French policy, it is hard not to read this paragraph as the professional military’s direct repudiation of the Bush-Gonzales-Rumsfeld torture doctrine.

Other historical cases cited in the manual provide similar, unsettling grounds for comparison. For example:

During Napoleon’s occupation of Spain in 1808, it seems little thought was given to the potential challenges of subduing the Spanish populace. Conditioned by the decisive victories at Austerlitz and Jena, Napoleon believed the conquest of Spain would be little more than a “military promenade.” Napoleon’s campaign included a rapid conventional military victory but ignored the immediate requirement to provide a stable environment for the populace.

The French failed to analyze the Spanish people, their history, culture, motivations and potential to support or hinder the achievement of French political objectives. … Napoleon’s cultural miscalculation resulted in a protracted occupation struggle that lasted nearly six years and ultimately required approximately three-fifths of the Empire’s total armed strength, almost four times the force of 80,000 Napoleon originally designated.

The Spanish resistance drained the resources of the French Empire. It was the beginning of the end for Napoleon.

The authors are not so blunt as to draw a direct comparison with Bush’s present misadventure, though they do certainly invite one. (Note the phrase “military promenade,” so like the “cake walk” we were promised in Iraq.) The analogy also poses inevitable questions, questions the manual does not and probably cannot answer directly: Given the central importance of political legitimacy, what do you do when the government is not legitimate, when the war is not just? What happens when the moral high ground has been irrevocably lost?

The counterinsurgency Field Manual hints at an answer. It comes as the heading to the Algerian case study quoted above: “Lose Moral Legitimacy, Lose the War.”

Petraeus the general still insists that the war can be won; Petraeus the theorist would seem to disagree.

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• Reader Comments

  What is it about Petreus that has all of our legislators cowed?  Ever since his assignment regarding the training of Iraqi police/army was announced two years ago he has been heaped with praise and statements of confidence by every senator or congressperson of both parties at every possible opportunity - despite the fact that these training operations have been slow and inadequate. 

  Perhaps its his Roman-centurian name that appeals to these people working in giant classical edifices behind marble pillars.  They should abandon their daydreams of Imperial glory and focus on his performance record and irrational sycophancy.

  Posted by Ken Duerksen on Mar 6, 2007 at 7:08 AM

  Ken,

  What is it about Petraeus?

  It is that what he did in Mosul should have been done across the whole of Iraq (CENTCOM planning called for 500,000 troops.).

  If we didn’t have the forces, we should not have attempted such a mission.

  Rumsfeld turned away all who disagreed with his low number of boots.

  McCain has it right, “Rumsfeld will go down in history as our worst Secretary of Defense.” To beat out McNamara for the title is a dubious achievement.

  Most of our legislators only respond to a lobbyist throwing money, so we went in under-manned, under-supplied, and under-equipped. The result is an extremely under-whelming success.

  Posted by whattheheck on Mar 7, 2007 at 9:22 AM

  “The dissolution of the Iraqi army, the de-Baathification of the civil service, the failure to guard important historic and cultural sites, the granting of reconstruction contracts to American firms, and the long-term neglect of legal due process”

  Th Iraqi army was dissolved by Saddam not the US. When we reached Baghdad the army had melted back into the civilian population. The only combatants were Republican Guard and Fedayeen. The Baath party was a Arab socialist party which explains the great love progressives have for it. The entire system was corrupt and baised towards Sunnis. The Sunni population controlled every governmental office, the police, the judicial system, education, and the military. The expulsion of these criminals was vital to ensure a democratic Iraq. Failure to guard historic sites? Iraqis looted their own treausures. We are not responsible for the failures of the Iraqi people. American money is rebuilding Iraq as such American companies should do the work. Due process for whom? The terrorists in Guantanamo? Iraqi citizens didn’t have due process before we invaded. These terrorists were captured by the US military.The military does not operate under civilian laws.  As such they have no “rights” except what the UCMJ allows. American courts have no jurisdiction over them. So they remain in legal limbo.

  Posted by texasindependent on Mar 7, 2007 at 2:50 PM

  question texind...How is it progressives “love” the Baath Party when it was the Reagan Administration that was making deals with Saddam, Rumsfeld shaking the hand of Hussein AFTER, repeat AFTER it was known that Saddam had slammed the Kurds with chemical terrorism. The UN had put out a report on the incidents, the Reagan clan couldn’t claim they didn’t know, yet, there they were dealing with Hussein. So, it was regular old Republicans that apparently loved the Baath Party and their leader Saddam Hussein.

  We certainly are responsible for what happened after we decided to shock and awe them. Bush decided to get into the nation building game, but didn’t know how to do it. They start by destroying the electrical grid, water supply, roads, etc. Then they don’t protect facilities such as banks, ministry buildings, ammo stashes, hospitals, on and on. They certainly did anticipate problems of looting because they made sure to guard the oil ministry and oil facilities. They chose selective protection because they didn’t have the plan or the troops to keep looting to a minimum. The looting was demoralizing to most Iraqis who didn’t participate in the actions. They couldn’t understand how the US could let this happen. The inaction to the looting (soldiers were actually standing around watching it happen with no orders to try to quell it) was essentially the beginning of opposition to American occupation by many Iraqis. Many thought, “they let this happen, we can’t trust them.”

  Yes, the army didn’t fight. Plenty in the army had no real allegiance to Saddam. But in the immediate aftermath, there were no other Iraqis trained as a military and virtually every expert in retrospect realize that not recruiting a portion of the former army to form a new army was a big mistake. Many former military ended up joining the insurgency simply out of nothing else to do, they were unwelcome to the Americans so fighting them seemed the thing to do. There were plenty of Baath Party members willing to be part of a new Iraq. Many Iraqis joined the party simply out of ability to gain jobs. The idea that all Baathists were evil, criminals or loved Saddam is so far removed from reality that anyone thinking that hasn’t a clue about Iraq.

  It’s just become known that prior to the 2003 invasion that we paid off oil workers and promised them future jobs to not burn up the wells or destroy oil infrastructure. And in fact virtually no damage was done. Nearly all of those workers would have been Baath Party members, as Saddam would only trust Sunnis with the oil. By dealing with them rather than shunning them and declaring them unusable as we did with all the rest of the Baath Party we managed to protect the oil infrastructure at the beginning. It shows how much the Iraq War had oil imprinted into the brains of the Bushies. They did everything they could think to protect oil, but hospitals, banks, museums, weapons caches? No way! That was a big mistake and a huge insight into the way Bush builds nations. Incompetence, the shock and awe and ground game had at least 2 years of planning but the occupation was nothing but an ad lib afterthought.

  The plain truth is that the designers of the Iraq War, the neocons, were enthralled with an ideology and couldn’t think in terms of on the ground reality. They never took the in-depth time and effort to understand Iraq and Iraqis before the war. They simplistically thought that a nation of people as beaten and war weary (Iran, Gulf Storm, sanctions) would kiss the feet of their liberators no matter what we did. But then we let the looting fun begin, and the average Iraqi looked at this liberation and wondered how we were so different than Saddam, why trust the Americans.

  Posted by Jon B on Mar 8, 2007 at 8:32 AM

  The world is crowded with thinking people, stop underestimating us. So, all that story about “starting democracy in Irak”, “mass destruction weapons” “danger to the region” are not convincing anybody. The smell of oil is so strong we all know the game being played. As to Bin Laden, I wouldn’t be surprised if he had agreed to play “bad guy” in the comedy for a share of the booty. The new focus on South America stinks. Nobody has chosen the USA as a moral authority to say which country is doing the right thing, so stick to your borders and take care of your own serious problems.

  Posted by Maria on Mar 9, 2007 at 7:04 PM

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